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ABSTRACT
Why do firms decide to offshore certain parts of their production process? What qualifies certain
countries as particularly attractive locations to offshore? In this paper we address these questions
with a theory of international production hierarchies in which organizations arise endogenously to
make efficient use of agents' knowledge. Our theory highlights the role of host-country management
skills  (middle  management)  in  bringing  about  the  emergence  of  international  offshoring.  By
shielding top management in the source country from routine problems faced by  host country
workers, the presence of middle managers improves the efficiency of the transmission of knowledge
across countries. The model further delivers the prediction that the positive effect of middle skills
on offshoring is weaker, the more advanced are communication technologies in the host country. We
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Recent developments in the world economy have led to a staggering disintegration of the
production process across borders.1 Why do ﬁrms decide to oﬀshore certain parts of their
production process to foreign locations? What qualiﬁes certain countries as particularly
attractive locations to oﬀshore? In this paper we address these questions with a theory
of production hierarchies in which cross-country diﬀerences in the distribution of skills,
as well as diﬀerences in the cost of transmitting knowledge internationally versus locally,
determine the decision to oﬀshore or not to a particular country.
Our model illustrates how the decision to oﬀshore parts of the production process
to foreign countries may be associated with changes in the organizational structure of
ﬁrms, as ﬁrms may introduce intermediate layers of managers to minimize the costs of
transmitting knowledge across borders. More speciﬁcally, our theory describes situations
in which international oﬀshoring to a particular host country is only proﬁtable if the
production facility in the host country is composed of two layers rather than one: a set of
workers specialized in production and a set of middle managers in charge of supervision.
By shielding the top management in the home country from having to deal with routine
problems faced by workers in the host country, the presence of middle managers allows a
more eﬃcient (time-saving) transmission of knowledge across countries.
As in Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), we develop these ideas in a gen-
eral equilibrium framework with two countries, the North and the South. We model a
world economy in which production requires time and knowledge, and where agents with
heterogenous abilities sort into teams competitively. The distribution of skills in the host
country (the South) plays a central role in the analysis. In particular, in situations in
which the eﬃc i e n to r g a n i z a t i o no fp r o d u c t i o nd e m a n d st h ep r e s e n c eo fm i d d l em a n a g e r s
in the host country, the availability of “middle skills” in the host country becomes crucial
for attracting oﬀshoring.
We show however that the availability of “middle skills” is not always conducive to
oﬀshoring into a particular country. When the communication technologies available
to southern teams are suﬃciently developed, the presence of middle skills may actually
hinder the emergence of oﬀshoring. The intuition for this result is that advanced southern
communication technologies foster the formation of domestic teams in the host country,
thus increasing the opportunity cost and equilibrium remuneration of local agents hired by
1See Feenstra (1998) or the more recent but less formal account in Friedman (2005).
1multinational ﬁrms.2 We show that this increase in the opportunity cost of host-country
agents may be large enough to altogether deter oﬀshoring to that particular country.
Our analysis thus shows that the distribution of skills in host countries, together with
local production possibilities, are crucial in determining the desirability of a country as a
target of oﬀshoring. We examine the empirical validity of one of the main predictions of
the model using data on average FDI inﬂows and educational attainment measures in a
large cross-section of countries in the period 1993-2002. After constructing an index of the
availability of communication technologies in diﬀerent countries, we show that consistent
with the model, a higher availability of middle skills (as measured by secondary school
enrollment) is associated with higher FDI inﬂows (as a percentage of GDP) into countries
with poor communication technologies, but with lower FDI inﬂows into countries with
advanced communication technologies.3
This paper is most closely related to our previous work in Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006), where we developed the notion of international oﬀshoring as being
the outcome of the assignment of heterogeneous agents into international hierarchical
teams. In that paper we studied the consequences of international team formation for
the matching between managers and workers and for the implied structure of wages. For
that purpose, we simpliﬁed our analysis by focusing on two-layer teams and by drawing no
distinction between international and local communication costs within multinational and
in southern teams. As a consequence of these features, the model ruled out any active
role of host-country middle managers and always generated international oﬀshoring in
equilibrium, being thus unable to shed light on the extensive margin of oﬀshoring.4
In a related paper, Burstein and Monge (2005) use an extension of Lucas’ (1978) span
2In the model, whether host-country domestic teams are formed or not depends on the level of southern
communication costs. We stick to this interpretation in the empirical section of the paper, but it should
be clear that, in the real world, other technological and institutional factors play an important role in
fostering or hindering the formation of such teams.
3Our results also seem to accord well with casual discussions of particular oﬀshoring decisions. For
instance, Spar (1998) and Larraín, López-Calva, and Rodríguez-Clare (2001) describe the decision of
Intel to locate a microprocessor plant in Costa Rica in 1996. Intel was considering four alternative
locations in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Both these studies describe the main
factors that made Intel ﬁnally decide to locate the plant in Costa Rica despite frequent bottlenecks in
telecommunication and electricity services in the country. The authors emphasize the availability of
highly-trained graduates in Costa Rica as being one of the decisive factors. Further evidence of the
importance that Intel gave to “middle skills” comes from the active involvement of the company in
redeﬁning the curricula of the country’s technical high schools and advanced training programs (Spar,
1998, p. 19)
4Our model is also related to models of vertical FDI and outsourcing, where the incentive to fragment
the production process is driven by factor-price diﬀerentials (see Helpman, 1984, Yeaple, 2003, and Antràs,
2003).
2of control model to analyze FDI ﬂows across countries. Their analysis distinguishes be-
tween ﬁrm speciﬁc and host country embedded productivity and shows how the lack of
high productivity ﬁrms in the host country, combined with high country-wide embedded
productivity, fosters oﬀshoring. In contrast with this paper, our analysis incorporates en-
dogenous organizational structures with potentially more than two layers. We therefore
underscore the role of middle managers in increasing ﬁrm productivity and the role of
local communication costs in determining a country’s embedded productivity.
The remainder of the paper contains six sections. In Section II, we describe the general
setup. In Section III, we analyze the emergence of oﬀs h o r i n gi nam o d e lw h e r eah o s t
c o u n t r y( t h eS o u t h )h a sv e r yl i m i t e do p p o r t u n i t i e so fp r o d u c t i o na n dw ei l l u s t r a t et h e
positive role of middle managers in bringing about oﬀshoring. In Section IV, we look
at the other polar case in which the North and the South share access to the same
communication technologies, while in Section V we consider intermediate cases. Section
VI summarizes one of the key empirical implication of the theory and contrasts it with
the data. The last section concludes.
II. GENERAL SET UP
The model builds on Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) -AGR hereafter-,
which in turn builds on Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a). The framework here is
simpler in that we assume a discrete number of skill levels (rather than a continuum).
The model is however more general than AGR in that (i) we allow for the formation
of teams with more than two layers (which is a prerequisite for studying the role of
middle management); and (ii) we introduce diﬀerences between the costs of transmitting
knowledge locally and internationally.
The world economy is inhabited by a unit measure of agents, each endowed with a skill
level z ∈ [0,1] and a unit of time. The distribution of skills in the world population is
given by the distribution function:
s(z)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
sh if z = zh
sm if z = zm
sl if z = zl
,
with zh >z m >z l and sh+ sm + sl =1 .5
5Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006b) use a similar framework, with a discrete number of skill levels,
to study the emergence of large US corporations at the turn of the 20th century.
3The world consists of two countries: the North and the South. As in AGR, we assume
t h a tt h eN o r t ha n dt h eS o u t ha r ee n d o w e dw i t hd i ﬀerent distributions of skills, with the
North being endowed with relatively higher skill levels. We capture this feature in a stark
way: all agents in the North are endowed with a skill level equal to zh, while agents
in the South are endowed with a skill level equal to zm or zl.6 Our assumptions on the
distribution of skills lead to a stylized model of the decision of high skilled northern agents
on whether to oﬀshore to the South or remain self-employed.7
Agents derive linear utility from consuming the only good in the economy, whose price
is normalized to one. Production of this good combines labor and knowledge. As in
Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a), production requires solving
t h ep r o b l e m st h a ta r i s ei np r o d u c t i o n .A na g e n tw i t hs k i l lz can solve all problems indexed
between 0 and z, so an agent with skill z0 >zcan solve all the problems that z can solve
plus some extra ones. That is, knowledge is cumulative. We normalize the set of problems
so that the skill level z is also the proportion of problems an agent can solve. Agents have
one unit of time that they can use in production or communicating with other agents.
Agents face a unit measure of problems per unit of production time and we normalize
output so that a unit measure of solved problems yields one unit of output.
Agents can choose to produce together in teams or work on their own (self-employment).
A self-employed agent with knowledge z spends all his time in production and solves a
fraction z of the problems that he confronts. Hence, his expected output and income is
given by y = z. Agents producing in teams can communicate their knowledge to others,
and thus help them solve problems. This possibility allows them to form organizations in
which several individuals combine their time and knowledge to produce together. Such or-
ganizations are composed of production workers, who draw problems, and problem solvers
(managers), who can answer questions and thus help workers solve the problems they can-
not solve on their own. Agents are income maximizers and so choose the occupation that
pays them the highest wage given their ability.
Workers draw problems and try to solve them. If they can, they produce; if they
cannot, they ask for help to the managers right above them, in which case these managers
incur a communication cost hi ∈ (0,1),w h e r ei denotes the identity and location of the
parties communicating (which we will specify below). If the manager knows the solution
6This implies that the relative size of the North is given by sh/(sm + sl).
7It would be straightforward to extend the analysis and allow domestic team formation in the North.
This would however substantially increase the taxonomy of cases to consider without providing many
insights into the role of southern skills in fostering oﬀshoring.
4to the problem the team produces output. If the manager does not know the solution but
has a manager above him, he asks this manager for help, and this upper-level manager
incurs a communication cost hj (more on this below). In such a case, production occurs
only if the upper-level manager knows the solution to the problem. The skill distribution
we assume above, with only three levels of skill, implies that three organizational forms
can potentially arise in equilibrium, namely, three-layer teams, two-layer teams, and self-
employed agents.8 Hence, the above discussion suﬃces to cover the workings of all possible
production teams.
To summarize, production is organized in knowledge hierarchies, with some agents spe-
cialized in production and some in management. This production structure also gives
rise to ‘management by exception,’ whereby production workers deal with the most com-
mon problems and problem solvers with the exceptions. These characteristics are optimal
under the assumption that agents do not know who may know the solution to problems
they cannot solve, as Garicano (2000) showed in a model with homogeneous workers. The
purpose of the hierarchy is to protect the knowledge of those who are more knowledgeable
from easy questions others can solve.
Communication costs depend on the circumstance in which communication occurs. We
denote communication costs within southern teams that are not part of a multination-
als by hS. Communication costs between southern agents within a multinational are
denoted by hL, and international communication costs by hI. We assume throughout
that international communication costs are higher than local communication costs within
multinational teams, and so hI >h L. We also assume that local communication technol-
ogy within multinational teams is at least as good as southern communication technology
available to agents belonging to southern teams, and so hL ≤ hS.
Hence, multinationals will provide two diﬀerent inputs to agents in the South: ﬁrst, the
ability to beneﬁt from the knowledge of high-skilled agents in the North; and second, access
to a (weakly) better technology for local communication. We interpret the latter feature
as a form of technology transfer from multinationals to the South.9 Throughout the
paper we assume that there is no international market for the better local communication
8More speciﬁcally, it is never optimal to assign two agents with the same skill level to diﬀerent layers
of an organization (or to have subordinates with higher talent than managers). The reason is that then
managers would not increase the output of subordinates but the cost of production would increase by
their wage (see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006a).
9This feature is also consistent with widely available data suggesting that foreign aﬃliates of multi-
national ﬁrms appear to be more productive than comparable domestic ﬁrms in the same host country
(see for instance, Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
5technology of multinationals. On top of local telecomunications, this technology can be
though of as processes and a common culture that are designed to facilitate information
ﬂows within the team. Such processes are not codiﬁed or systematized and, therefore,
cannot be sold or transferred in the market across borders and ﬁrm boundaries (e.g.
Arrow, 1974).10 As we will see below the relative quality of the local multinational and
southern technologies will be crucial in the analysis.
Let us illustrate how production in a two-layer team is carried out. Suppose a top
manager with knowledge z2 leads a team of n0 production workers. These workers draw
a unit measure of problems each, and solve a fraction z0 of them. Hence they pass on a
fraction (1 − z0) of all problems. Managers are thus asked to solve n0 (1 − z0) problems,
which they can address in n0 (1 − z0)hi units of time. Optimally, managers join teams
with precisely the right number of production workers so that they use all their time.
Since all agents have one unit of time available, the team size n0 is implicitly given by
n0hi(1 − z0)=1 , (1)
where i ∈ {I,L,S}. The time constraint implies that the span of the manager is limited
by the knowledge of their subordinates.
Output is produced whenever either workers or manager know the solution to the
problems, so
y = z2n0.
Note the source of complementarity between skills in our model: An able top manager
increases the productivity of all workers in the team. At the same time, the more knowl-
edgeable are subordinates, the larger the team and the more can managers leverage their
knowledge.
Denote the earnings of workers by w0. Then zero proﬁts implies that the wage of
managers is given by




Production in three-layer teams is similar but it includes a measure n1 of middle man-
agers. Let their skill level be given by z1. Then if the skill of workers is given by z0,t h e
top manager is only asked to solve n0 (1 − z1) problems, while the layer of middle man-
agers are asked to solve n0 (1 − z0) problems. The time constraints of these two-layers of
10Note also that if one could systematize these processes in manuals, we would expect markets for
this technology not to form. The breakdown of this market would result from low marginal costs of
reproducing this technology combined with the imperfect enforcement of patent laws.
6managers are thus
n0hi (1 − z1)=1 (2)
and
n0hj (1 − z0)=n1,( 3 )
where hj for j ∈ {I,L,S} denotes the cost of communicating knowledge from top to
middle managers. These two equations pin down the size of each of the two lower layers
in the team.
Denoting the earnings of middle managers by w1,w eh a v et h a t
w2 = n0(z2 − w0) − n1w1 =
z2 − w0 − hj (1 − z0)w1
hi(1 − z1)
.
In the next three sections, we turn to analyze the equilibrium of our two-country world
economy, where all agents maximize utility and labor markets clear in both countries. We
denote by wi the earnings of an agent with skill zi. Note that if the equilibrium is such
that a fraction of agents with skill level zi remain self-employed, then the equilibrium
wage of all agents with that skill level necessarily equals wi = zi.
As mentioned above, the simple skill distribution we have assumed implies that we
can focus on studying three-layer teams, two-layer teams, and self-employment. This is
because it is never optimal to assign two agents with the same skill level to diﬀerent layers
of an organization. Similarly, a team will never have a manager that is less skilled than
his subordinates. In terms of the speciﬁcs of our two-country model, this implies that
northern agents with skill zh will either be self-employed or top managers, while southern
agents with skill zl will either be self-employed or workers. Southern agents with skill zm
may be top managers of two-layer teams, middle managers, workers or self-employed.
We shall assume throughout that sh is suﬃciently low relative to sm and sl,w h i c h
ensures that high-skilled northern agents are self-employed only in situations in which all
other agents in the world economy are also self-employed.11
III. EQUILIBRIUM WITH INEFFICIENT SOUTHERN
COMMUNICATION
We start by analyzing a situation in which the local communication costs hS faced by
southern agents in domestic teams are so high that domestic southern teams never form.
11Without this assumption high-skilled northern agents would not appropriate the proﬁts of the team
and would thus be indiﬀerent to the organizational form and the decision to oﬀshore.











I nw o r d s ,t o t a lp r o d u c t i o ni nal o c a ls o u t h e r nt e a mi ss m a l l e rt h a nw h a ti t sm e m b e r sc a n
get if they work as self-employed. This leads to a world economy that will be in one of
four possible equilibria:12
1. No Oﬀshoring
This corresponds to a situation in which agents in the North do not ﬁnd proﬁtable to
form two or three-layer teams with agents in the South. In such a case, all agents are
necessarily self-employed (since middle- and low-skilled agents do not form teams in the
South). This implies that all agents earn their self-employment wages:
wi = zi for i = h,m,l.
2. Two-Layer Middle Skill Oﬀshoring (z0 = zm)
In this case, northern agents decide to form international teams, but only with southern





where wm refers to the wage of southern middle-skilled agents. It is clear that agents
with skill zl will in this case be self-employed and thus wl = zl.F u r t h e r m o r e ,n o t i c et h a t
equation (1) with hi = hI pins down the relative share of agents of each type in a two-layer
team as a function of parameters. It will thus be the case that, for suﬃciently low sh (our
assumption above), a fraction of medium-skilled agents will also remain unemployed in
equilibrium, and thus wm = zm.13
3. Two-Layer Low Skill Oﬀshoring (z0 = zl)
This case is similar to the one above, but now northern agents form teams with low-





12We ignore the possibility of “mixed equilibria,” with some of the four situations below coexisting.
The discussion below should make clear that, for a suﬃciently low fraction sh of high-skilled agents (our
maintained assumption), these mixed equilibria can only happen in knife-edge cases.
13What do we mean by a “suﬃciently low sh”? For this particular case, the condition for medium-
skilled agents to be in excess supply at a wage higher than zm is given by sh <s mhI(1−zm). Analogous
conditions can be derived for the other cases.
8I na d d i t i o n ,i ti sc l e a r l yt h ec a s et h a twm = zm (all medium-skilled southern agents are
self-employed), and for suﬃciently low sh, a fraction of the low-skilled southern agents
will also be self-employed, implying that wl = zl.
4. Three-Layer Oﬀshoring
In this case, agents in the North form three-layer teams and obtain a wage given by
wh =
zh − wl − wmhL(1 − zl)
hI(1 − zm)
. (4)
Notice from equations (2) and (3) that the relative shares of agents of each type in these
teams are ﬁxed, in the sense that they are pinned down by parameters. It will thus
(generically) be the case that a fraction of agents of at least two types will end up being
self-employed in equilibrium, and the wages of these two types will then be determined
by their self-employment wages. For low enough sh, it will necessarily be the case that
all agents in the South will earn their self-employment wages: wm = zm and wl = zl.
III. A. Communication Costs, Middle Skills and Oﬀshoring
Having described these four potential types of equilibria, let us study when they emerge
in equilibrium. First note that high-skilled agents in the North always prefer to form two-
layer teams with low-skilled agents than two-layer teams with medium-skilled agents.
That is,
zh − zl




for all zm >z l. This implies that given our assumptions on the supply of skills, equilibria
of type 2 never arise.14
Next note that an equilibrium with three-layer oﬀshoring requires






hI (1 − zl)
¾
.( 5 )
Straightforward diﬀerentiation implies that the left-hand side of this inequality is increas-
ing in middle skills zm if and only if




In that case, when zm is close to zl, (5) will not hold, while when zm is suﬃciently large,
(5) will necessarily hold. Hence, there exist a unique threshold skill level b zm ∈ (zl,1) over
14Note that this is not inconsistent with skill stratiﬁcation and positive sorting (see Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2006a).
9which three-layer oﬀshoring is an equilibrium and under which it is not. The threshold
b zm is obtained by setting (5) to equality.
In the converse case in which hL > b hL, one can easily verify that condition (5) cannot
possibly hold for any zm ∈ (zl,1), and thus three-layer oﬀshoring cannot be an equilib-
rium.15 In such case, the equilibrium will entail no oﬀshoring or two-layer oﬀshoring. In
particular, no oﬀshoring is preferred to two-layer oﬀshoring if international communication
costs are high zh > (zh − zl)/[hI (1 − zl)],o r
zhhI > b hL,( 7 )
while two-layer oﬀs h o r i n gi sp r e f e r r e dt on oo ﬀshoring when the converse of condition (7)
holds.16
Formally stated, if we deﬁne oﬀshoring as the volume of production in multinational
teams, we have shown that:
Proposition 1 If hS ≥ b hS, there exists two thresholds b hL ∈ (0,1) and b zm ∈ (zl,1) such
that:
(i) Three-layer oﬀshoring is an equilibrium if and only if hL < b hL and zm > b zm.
(ii) Otherwise, oﬀshoring is independent of zm.I f zhhI > b hL there is no oﬀshoring in
equilibrium, while if zhhI < b hL two-layer oﬀshoring is an equilibrium.
Because the choice between no oﬀshoring and two-layer oﬀshoring is independent of
zm, we can thus conclude that a larger zm tends to (weakly) favor the emergence of an
equilibrium with oﬀshoring.17 In addition, the output of oﬀshoring teams is (weakly)
increasing in the skill level of middle managers. Therefore, we can conclude that:
Corollary 1 If hS ≥ b hS,i ne q u i l i b r i u mo ﬀshoring is (weakly) increasing in the skill level
zm of middle-skilled agents.
15This is because, when hL > (zh − zl)/(1 − zl), the left-hand side of (5) is decreasing in zm,a n dt h e
condition is not satisﬁed for zm = zl.
16Note that in order for three-layer teams to be necessary for the emergence of oﬀshoring we need that
both zm > b zm and
zhhI > b hL >h L.
In words, we need that middle-skilled agents in the South are relatively able and that the cost of com-
municating knowledge across borders is large relative to the cost of communicating knowledge within
borders.
17Since b hS depends on zm,i n c r e a s e si nzm may move the equilibrium away from the set in which the
proposition applies, namely, hS ≥ b hS. However, we will show below (Proposition 2) that when hS < b hS
the equilibrium has the same properties.
10Our analysis therefore highlights the role of middle-skilled agents in fostering oﬀshoring.
Intuitively, higher ability middle-skilled agents are better able to protect top managers in
the North from “expensive” routine problems, thus making oﬀshoring more attractive.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM WITH EFFICIENT SOUTHERN COMMUNICATION
In the previous section we have shown that the existence of “middle skills” in the South
fosters international oﬀshoring. This section brieﬂy illustrates that this result heavily
relies on our assumption that domestic team formation is limited by high local southern
communication costs.
To see this, consider the case in which hS = hL and so local communication costs are
the same no matter if local communication happens within multinational teams or within
southern domestic teams. Relative to the previous section, the only new feature is that
an equilibrium may now include two-layer teams between agents with skills zm and zl.





If this condition was not satisﬁed in equilibrium, southern agents would have incentives
to deviate from that equilibrium and form two-layer teams among themselves. Using
condition (8), one can show that the rents that northern agents with skill zh obtain from
three-layer oﬀshoring must satisfy
wh =









With the possibility of the formation of two-layer southern teams, there is an additional
instrument to clear factor markets, and (generically) the equilibrium will now feature
only one type of agents being (partially) self-employed. Condition (9) above implies
that whenever some agents with skills zm or zl are self-employed (which will be the case
whenever sh is low, as we have been assuming throughout), then three-layer oﬀshoring
will be dominated by two-layer international oﬀshoring.18
The intuition behind this result is that when agents in the South have the option of
forming teams between themselves, the opportunity cost of forming three-layer interna-
tional teams increases to the point where these become unproﬁtable.19
18Note also that when high-skilled northern agents are (partially) self-employed, then they will earn
the same wage regardless of the equilibrium organization. They are thus indiﬀerent between diﬀerent
organizational modes.
19This is not the case in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a) where the incentives for top managers
11How do medium skills aﬀect the extensive margin of oﬀshoring in this case? It is
straightforward to see that whenever low-skilled southern agents are partially self-employed,
then wl = zl. And since wm ≥ zm,t w o - l a y e ro ﬀshoring will only emerge if it involves low-
skilled workers. The analysis of this case is as in the previous section, with oﬀshoring
emerging only if zhhI < b hL, which is independent of zm. If, alternatively, middle-skilled
southern agents are partially self-employed then it is no longer clear which type of two-
layer oﬀshoring will emerge in equilibrium. This depends on a relative comparison of
(zh − zm)/[hI(1 − zm)] and [zh − zm (1 − hL (1 − zl))]/[hI(1 − zl)]. Regardless, of the
form of two-layer oﬀshoring, it is clear however that a larger zm will reduce the attrac-
tiveness of oﬀshoring versus no oﬀshoring.
This section has therefore shown that the emergence of oﬀshoring, and in particular that
of three-layer oﬀshoring, depends crucially on ineﬃcient local communication technology
in the South. If this technology is as good as the one used by multinationals, better
medium-skilled agents imply better local teams, not more oﬀshoring! On the contrary,
with good local communication the model is actually consistent with better middle skills
in the South reducing the attractiveness of oﬀshoring.
V. THE INTERMEDIATE CASE
Let us ﬁnally consider intermediate cases. In particular, consider the case in which the
technology to communicate in the South is less eﬃcient than the local communication




hS (1 − zl)
. (10)
When hS is high enough (hS ≥ b hS), two-layer southern teams will not be formed in
equilibrium and the analysis is as in Section III. For lower hS (hS < b hS), these teams will
be formed and will ensure that only one type of agent is self-employed in equilibrium. Let
us focus on these situations hereafter.
We next consider the four cases discussed in Section III, but now taking into account
that the wages of southern agents will satisfy (10) with equality. To simplify the exposi-
tion, we will focus on the case in which sl is high enough to ensure that low-skilled southern
agents are partially self-employed, and thus wl = zl and wm =( zm − zl)/[hS (1 − zl)].
to acquire knowledge increase with the size of their teams, making three (or more) layer teams proﬁtable
even though agents in lower layers can organize by themselves.
12We brieﬂy consider an alternative scenario at the end of this section.
As in Section III, we begin by noting that since wm >z m whenever hS < b hS,t w o -
layer oﬀshoring with middle-skilled southern agents will again be dominated by two-layer
oﬀshoring with low-skilled southern agents. Furthermore, since wl = zl,t h ec o m p a r i s o n
between this latter option and no oﬀshoring is identical to that discussed in Section III and
no oﬀshoring will dominate two-layer oﬀshoring whenever zhhI > b hL (where remember
that b hL ≡ (zh − zl)/(1 − zl)) and vice versa when zhhI < b hL.
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.( 1 1 )
Straightforward diﬀerentiation implies that the left-hand side of this inequality is increas-
ing in middle skills zm if and only if
hL/hS < b hL.( 1 2 )
This condition is analogous to (6) in Section III, but it also applies to cases in which hS is
not prohibitively high (i.e., hS < 1) .M o r e o v e r ,i ti sa g a i nt h ec a s et h a tp r o v i d e dt h a t( 1 2 )
holds, when zm is close to zl,( 1 1 )w i l ln o th o l d ,w h i l ew h e nzm is suﬃciently large, (11)
will necessarily hold. Hence, there again exists a unique threshold skill level ¯ zm ∈ (zl,1) —
obtained by setting (11) to equality — over which three-layer oﬀshoring is an equilibrium
and under which it is not.
Following the same logic as in Section III, one can show that in the converse case in
which hL/hS > b hL, condition (11) cannot possibly hold for any zm ∈ (zl,1), and thus
three-layer oﬀshoring cannot be an equilibrium. In such case, the equilibrium will entail
no oﬀshoring or two-layer oﬀshoring, with the choice determined by the relative size of
zhhI and b hL.
Formally stated we have shown that:
Proposition 2 If hS < b hS, there exists two thresholds b hL ∈ (0,1) and ¯ zm ∈ (zl,1) such
that:
(i) Three-layer oﬀshoring is an equilibrium if and only if hL/hS < b hL and zm > ¯ zm.
(ii) Otherwise, oﬀshoring is independent of zm.I f zhhI > b hL there is no oﬀshoring in
equilibrium, while if zhhI < b hL two-layer oﬀshoring is an equilibrium.
13Relative to Proposition 1, the main new result is the eﬀect of the domestic commu-
nication cost hS. Consistently with the results in Section IV, if hS is suﬃciently low,
then three-layer oﬀshoring may cease to emerge in equilibrium, and the condition that
determines the emergence of oﬀshoring is independent of zm. In particular, notice that
whenever hS → hL, as in Section IV, the condition hL/hS < b hLcannot possibly hold
(because b hL < 1), which explains why we did not observe three-layer teams emerging in
equilibrium in that case.
In addition, straightforward diﬀerentiation also indicates that the positive eﬀect of zm
on the left-hand-side of equation (11) is increasing in hS.20 This implies that the positive
eﬀect of zm on the attractiveness of an equilibrium with three-layer oﬀshoring is not only
discreetly higher in the case with ineﬃcient southern communication costs, but it is also
t h ec a s et h a tt h i sm a r g i n a le ﬀect of zm smoothly increases as communication costs in the
South become worse.
Moreover, because the choice between no oﬀshoring and two-layer oﬀshoring is inde-
pendent of zm and hS, we can conclude that:
Corollary 2 If hS < b hS in equilibrium oﬀshoring is (weakly) increasing in the skill level
zm of middle-skilled agents. Furthermore, the positive eﬀect of zm is (weakly) increasing
in domestic communication costs hS in the South.
To sum up, this section has generalized the results in Section III and IV to the case in
which local communication costs in the South are high, but not prohibitive. Consistently
with the results above, we have found that middle skills can play a crucial role in bringing
out the emergence of oﬀshoring, but only when communication technologies in the South
are suﬃciently ineﬃcient.
V. A. Overall Eﬀect of Middle Skills
So far, we have divided the analysis in two regions: hS ≥ b hS (Section III) and hS < b hS
(Sections IV and V). Because the threshold b hS depends itself on zm,o n em a yw o r r yt h a t
by increasing zm we may jump from one region to another discontinuously. This is not
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14of (11) (the proﬁts from three layer oﬀshoring when hS < b hS) , we obtain exactly the
left-hand side of condition (5) (the proﬁts from three layer oﬀshoring when hS ≥ b hS). In
other words, the proﬁts from three-layer oﬀshoring are continuous in zm when we cross
b hS. Since the right-hand side of these conditions is identical in both cases, the positive
eﬀect of zm on three-layer oﬀshoring (or simply oﬀshoring) holds globally.
Figure 1: Offshoring, Middle Skills and Southern Communication Costs












































Figure 1 shows the diﬀerent thresholds that determine the values of zm and hS for which
t h e r ei so ﬀshoring in equilibrium and for which there is no oﬀshoring. In the graph, we
ﬁx e da l lo t h e rp a r a m e t e r sa n dl o o ka tt h et h r e s h o l d sa sf u n c t i o n so fzm and hS.W ec h o s e
parameter values such that international communication costs are high, zhhI > b hL, and so
either there is oﬀshoring via three layer teams or there is no oﬀshoring. That is, for these
parameter values oﬀshoring is never organized in two layer teams. The graph illustrates
that the North oﬀshores to the South only if middle skilled agents are able enough (high
zm) and if communication technology is ineﬃcient (hS high). This is also illustrated in
Figure 2, where we present the case where international communication costs are low and
so there is always oﬀshoring. However, oﬀshoring with three layers, and therefore middle
15skilled agents, only occurs for high zm and high hS.






























































The following corollary sums up our main result:
Corollary 3 In equilibrium, oﬀshoring is (weakly) increasing in the skill level zm of
middle-skilled agents. Furthermore, the positive eﬀect of zm is (weakly) increasing in
domestic communication costs hS in the South.
For the most part of the paper we have assumed that sl is high relative to sm and sh,
which ensures that some low-skilled agents are self-employed in equilibrium. The case in
which some middle-skilled agents are self-employed in equilibrium delivers very similar
results. In particular, the model continues to predict that the partial eﬀect of zm on
oﬀshoring is (weakly) increasing in hS.21 The main diﬀerence is that, consistently with
the results at the end of Section IV, the eﬀect of zm on oﬀshoring may now be negative
for suﬃciently low hS.
21In this case wl =[ 1− hS (1 − zl)]zm and wm = zm. This can be used to show that in the case of
three layer oﬀshoring or two layer oﬀshoring with low types ∂2wh/∂zm∂hS > 0, while in the case of two
layer oﬀshoring with medium types ∂2wh/∂zm∂hS =0 .
16VI. EVIDENCE
The simple model above was useful to understand the characteristics of target countries
that lead to international oﬀshoring. In this section we underscore the main empirical
implication of the model and present evidence that suggests that it is supported by the
data. In our theory, when southern communication costs are high, oﬀshoring increases
with the ability of medium-skilled agents (Corollary 3). The intuition is that, in some
cases, in order for high-skilled agents in the North to beneﬁtf r o mo ﬀshoring, they need
to add a layer of local managers that allows them to economize on international com-
munication costs. In order for middle-skilled agents to serve this role, they need to be
suﬃciently skilled and their opportunity cost must be suﬃciently low. Hence, the main
implication of the model is that in countries where local communication technology is
relatively bad (so middle managers can only lead small and ineﬃcient southern teams),
oﬀshoring increases with the ability of middle-skilled managers. In contrast, in countries
where communication technology is good, these middle managers will organize local teams
and so more talented middle-skilled agents may not result in more oﬀshoring, but only in
more productive local teams.
The main empirical prediction of the theory can then be expressed as:
T h ev o l u m eo fo ﬀshoring increases more with intermediate skills in countries where
communication technology is relatively bad than in countries where communication tech-
nology is relatively good.
Note that this implication of our theory takes as given the level of international commu-
nication technology hI, as well as the level of within multinational local communication
technology hL, and focuses on the level of local communication technology, hS,a st h e
source of cross-sectional variation in the data. To illustrate this, consider a northern ﬁrm
that is deciding where to oﬀshore, as in our theory. Then our empirical strategy assumes
that this ﬁrm faces the same hI and hL in any host country, but can choose where to
oﬀshore depending on the host-country’s hS.
To contrast this prediction with the data, we use data from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI). We use data on FDI inﬂo w sa saf r a c t i o no fG D Pa s
a measure of oﬀshoring.22 As a measure of intermediate skills we use the percentage
22We divide by GDP since the absolute level of oﬀshoring in the model can be arbitrarily determined
by choice of productivity and population size. We are aware that FDI is an imperfect measure of the
volume of oﬀshoring (see Lipsey, 2003). Unfortunately, data on the operations of oﬀshoring facilities is
17of agents in the relevant age range enrolled in secondary school (SSE). Finally, our
measure of southern communication costs is an index of the availability of communication
technologies constructed using data on telephone, computer and internet usage. The
Appendix includes a description of the factor analysis that leads to this index as well
as more details on the raw series. Using the index we divide countries into two sets.
Countries with bad communication technology (BCI =1 , for bad communication index)
and countries with good communication technology (BCI =0 ). The Appendix lists
both sets of countries. We use a dummy variable for communication costs instead of the
continuous index.23 This is because oﬀshoring is independent of hS whenever hS ≥ b hS,
so the model does not predict a strictly monotonic eﬀect of communication technology.
Throughout the analysis we use averages of these variables for the decade 1993-2002.
We use the set of 122 countries for which we have complete data for all the variables of
interest.
The raw data is presented in Figure 3. The ﬁgure also presents the corresponding
regression lines, using a quantile regression with medians. All results presented in this
section use quantile regressions to diminish the inﬂuence of outliers. The Appendix in-
cludes a discussion of quantile regressions and all results using OLS. In the graph, and
in all OLS results in the Appendix, we eliminate two countries from the sample: Lux-
embourg and Equatorial Guinea. Both of these countries have extraordinarily high FDI
over GDP ratios. This is probably the result of their small size and the predominance
of particular industries, characteristics that our model is not designed to address. All
quantile regressions do include these two observations. Figure 3 shows that at ﬁrst glance
the prediction of the theory does well. The regression line for countries with bad commu-
nication has a larger slope than for countries with good communication. In countries with
good communication technology the slope is in fact negative, which is consistent with the
prediction of the theory described at the end of Sections IV and V.
not available for a large-cross section of host countries.
23 The cutoﬀ used to build the dummy variable BCI is 0.5, which corresponds to one-half standard
deviation above the mean communication index. All our results are robust to increasing or decreasing
this cutoﬀ by one-quarter standard deviation. Consistent with the model, if we lower the threshold even
more (say to the mean communication index, that is, 0) the results become insigniﬁcant although they
have the predicted sign. The reason is that we are mixing countries for which the eﬀect of middle skills
should be positive with countries for which the eﬀect should be negative (such as Kuwait), which leads
to insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients.
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Regression Line Bad Communication
Regression Line Good Communication
Source: World Bank Development Indicators. All data points are averages for the decade 1993-2002. For visibility we left out 
Luxemburg and Equatorial Guinea with FDI/GDP equal to 459.47 and 43.84 respectively. The regression line coefficients and 
estimation procedure are reported in the text.  
The coeﬃcients of both regression lines are presented in the ﬁrst two columns of Table
1 (standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcant coeﬃcients at 1%, 5% and
10% levels). One may think that the result is due to the fact that the countries with good
communication all have SSE values higher than 70%, while the larger sample of countries
with low communication have values of SSE throughout the [0%,100%] range. This does
not seem to be the case. If we restrict the sample of countries with poor communication
t ot h eo n e st h a th a v eSSE > 70 (which results in a set of 31 countries), we obtain similar
qualitative results. The coeﬃcient on SSE then becomes .1665 with a standard error of
.0646 which is signiﬁcant at a 5% level. Hence, for the rest of the empirical study we use
the whole sample of countries.






























































Countries BCI =1 BCI =0 All All All All
#o fO b s . 93 29 122 122 122 122
We next seek to estimate more eﬃciently the interaction eﬀect between the BCI dummy
and secondary school enrollment by running a speciﬁcation that incorporates the whole
set of countries and includes an interaction term, together with the BCI dummy and the
level of SSE in the regression. The third column of Table 1 presents these results. The
prediction of our theory is that the interaction term should be positive and signiﬁcant, and
this is what we ﬁnd in Table 1. This result does not depend on the particular construction
of our index, as the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant at the
5% level using each of the components of the index separately.
A potential problem with these results is that secondary school enrollment may be
highly correlated with other factors that, one may reasonable argue, inﬂuence the level
of FDI/GDP, although they are not part of our theory. One of these factors is GDP
20per capita. In particular, our data on FDI inﬂows includes horizontal FDI, that is, FDI
aimed at producing and selling products in these countries. Because GDP per capita is
a proxy for market potential, it could have an independent eﬀect on the ratio FDI/GDP.
The fourth column of Table 1 presents the results if we add GDP per capita to our
empirical speciﬁcation. It is clear that this hardly changes our results. The coeﬃcient of
the interaction term remains positive and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of GDP per capita
is not signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Another concern is that our BCI index might be
capturing some general level of development in these countries. To address this, we have
also incorporated GDP as a dummy variable (that is, we divide the sample into high and
low income countries) as well as an interaction of SSE and GDP (both directly and as a
dummy variable). Our results are robust to these empirical exercises and in all cases the
variables related to GDP are not signiﬁcant as long as we incorporate the BCI index as
well.
Our theory makes a clear distinction between agents with diﬀerent skill levels. These
agents perform diﬀerent roles in the economy and have diﬀerent occupations in equilib-
rium. It is important, therefore, that these results are not just driven by some average
level of education, but by secondary or intermediate levels of education. In particular,
the prediction of our theory for the eﬀect of the skill level of medium-skilled agents on
FDI/GDP does not hold for low-skilled agents. Thus, to study whether the results pre-
sented reﬂect the forces in our theory, we repeat the regression presented in the fourth
column of Table 1 but using instead primary school enrollment (PSE). The results are
presented in the ﬁf t hc o l u m no fT a b l e1 . W eﬁnd reassuring that the interaction term
involving primary school enrollment and communication technology appears statistically
insigniﬁcant. To emphasize this conclusion we also run the regression using both levels
of schooling. In column 6, the interaction term of secondary schooling remains positive
and signiﬁcant, while the one for primary schooling is insigniﬁcant. Overall, we interpret
our results as strongly suggestive of the existence of a disproportionately positive eﬀect
of middle skills on oﬀshoring in countries with bad communication technology.
In linking the main prediction of the theory with this empirical exercise in Table 1 we
have equated secondary school enrollment to intermediate skills. In our setup, however,
these intermediate skills are the highest skill levels in developing countries. Therefore, a
reasonable concern is that the actual empirical counterpart of our intermediate skills is
probably some measure of tertiary education —which leaves post-graduate education as
the counterpart of high skills in the North— or a combination of tertiary and secondary
21education. Of course, secondary education is a requirement for tertiary education and so
the union of tertiary education and secondary educations is equivalent to using SSE. We
repeated the exercise in Table 1 and obtain the same qualitative results using tertiary
education. Given that many managers in less developed countries are agents without
college we prefer to call intermediate skills the union of secondary and tertiary school
enrollment and so, to save on space, we do not present the results using only tertiary
education.
A potential concern with the results above is that our index of local communication
costs is constructed using data on telephone, computer, and internet usage,w h i c hm a y
lead to endogeneity of our communication cost index. FDI can determine how much
agents use these technologies, which would lead to biased coeﬃcients. Following this logic,
a natural conjecture is that FDI decreases the index of bad communication technology,
and it does so more the higher secondary school enrollment. However, this mechanism
would tend to bias the interaction term towards zero. Hence, this type of endogeneity
would tend to reinforce our ﬁnding that the true coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant. Of
course, endogeneity may take other forms and so this argument does not deﬁnitely solve
the endogeneity problem. We would need better data on the state of communication
technology, not the use of technology, in order to rule out other potential sources of
endogeneity.
Table 2 in the Appendix presents the same six regressions using OLS instead of quantile
regressions. The results are qualitatively similar. We obtain all the right signs and all
the relevant coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, although only at the 10% level. Admittedly, this
body of evidence, although consistent with the theory, is more suggestive than conclusive.
Bilateral data (and preferably at the industry level) seems necessary to develop a much
more complete taxonomy of the characteristics that make some countries good targets of
oﬀshoring.24 We leave this for future research.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The theory we develop in this paper makes two main points. First, that the ability
of multinationals to change their organizational form and make use of agents with dif-
ferent talents is important to understand the decision of organizations to oﬀshore part
of their production. In our theory this organizational change takes the form of an extra
24See Ramondo (2005) for an attempt along these lines.
22intermediate layer of management, and so the ability of these managers becomes a crucial
determinant of the extensive margin of oﬀshoring. Second, that the local communication
technology of a country determines the opportunity costs of workers —since it determines
the characteristics of local teams— and therefore the desirability of such a country as a
target for oﬀshoring. In order to understand this second argument, and the interaction
between both of them, it is necessary to have a general equilibrium theory where these
opportunity costs and the oﬀshoring decisions are both determined in equilibrium.
These two main arguments lead to several empirical implications from which we have
highlighted one that can be readily contrasted with the data. Namely, that the ability of
middle-skilled agents increases oﬀshoring by relatively more in countries where communi-
cation technology is bad, than in countries where communication technology is relatively
good. The empirical results we present are encouraging in that they suggest that this is in
fact the case in the data, and that this relationship is not driven by the level of develop-
ment or the availability of agents with lower skills. The model has other predictions that
we have not studied empirically: most importantly, that oﬀshoring will happen in larger
teams (and with more layers) in countries where middle-skilled agents are relatively able.
Since this large teams are also more eﬃcient (output per worker is higher) this also pro-
vides an implication for the productivity of the ﬁr m st h a to ﬀshore to these countries. An
empirical investigation of this prediction requires, of course, data on ﬁrm characteristics
and so we leave it for future work.
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25APPENDIX: DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Communication Index
The raw data used to construct our index of the state of communication technology in each
country is taken from the online version of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI). The index is constructed using data on telephone, computer and internet usage. The
three series are, respectively, (i) ﬁxed line and mobile phone subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants;
(ii) personal computers per 1,000 inhabitants; and (iii) internet users per 1,000 inhabitants. To
build the communication index we ﬁrst average the three indicators for the 1993-2002 period,
and then we perform a factor analysis of the correlation matrix. We used the ﬁrst factor as
the basis for the country-by-country communication index, which has mean 0 and standard
deviation equal to 1.
A 0.5 cutoﬀ in this index yields a division of countries into 93 countries with “bad” com-
munication technologies (BCI =1 )a n d29 countries with “good” communication technologies
(BCI =0 ). We list the countries in each group below.
Countries with low communication costs (BCI =0 ):
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States.
Countries with high communications costs (BCI =1 ):
Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Etiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao, Latvia,
Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongo-
lia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Slovakia, South
Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Syria, Tan-
zania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis in Table 1, (Section VI) presents a quantile (median) regression, or
least absolute value model; the model chooses by maximum likelihood the vector of regressors
b to minimize
P
i |y − xb| (rather than, as in OLS,
P
i(y −xb)2). Such an estimator is preferred
whenever there are substantial outliers in the dependent variable, which are given excessive
weight in the calculation of the regression by OLS.
26Our results remain however unchanged if we proceed by OLS and restrict our attention to
as a m p l eo fc o u n t r i e sw i t hFDI/GDP < 40%. Such restriction excludes from the analysis
2 extreme outliers: Luxembourg, with an average FDI/GDP for the sample period of 459.5%
and Equatorial Guinea with an average of 43.84%. These should be compared to a sample
distribution with quantiles 1.44%, 2.93%, and 4.86%. For completeness, in Table 2 below we
present OLS results in exactly the same order as in Table 1 in the body of the paper.






























































Countries BCI =1 BCI =0 All All All All
# of Observations 92 28 120 120 120 120
R2 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08
27